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Abstract 
Euripides’ Suppliant Women and Thucydides’ account of Pericles’ leadership within the 
Athenian democracy of 431/430 BCE are good examples of classical Greek texts which ask 
citizen-audiences to reflect very deeply on the processes by which they come to make 
political or legislative decisions in a council or assembly. They also stimulate reflection 
among elite citizens and leaders on their own involvement in such processes. Both texts 
achieve these forms of reflection by anticipating recent empirical work in sociology, political 
psychology, ‘behavioural economics’ and cognitive science. These anticipations may reflect 
an elite ‘paternalistic’ approach to political rhetoric and leadership to an extent. But in the 
case of the mass art form of Greek tragedy, its dramatization of ‘pathologies’ and ‘errors’ of 
both mass deliberation and leaders’ responses to them may have contributed to Athens’ 
relative success as a participatory ‘deliberative democracy’ in which the masses were 
sovereign. 
Classical Greece’s primary unit of social and political organization was called the polis 
(plural: poleis). Scholars usually translate polis as ‘city-state’ but we will soon see why 
‘citizen-state’ is probably a better rendering for the classical period (500-300 BCE). In the 
fourth century BCE, Aristotle was able to argue ‘that every polis exists by nature’ and that 
‘man is by nature an animal of the polis’ (Politics 1.2.1252b30-53a2). He thereby captured 
the extent to which this particular conception of community had come to dominate the 
Greeks’ definition of what it meant to be fully human. The dramatic and historiographical 
representations of political deliberation and decision-making which are the focus of this 
article were written by two Athenian ‘animals of the polis’: Euripides and Thucydides. And I 
will argue that these representations must have prompted Greek (and especially Athenian) 
citizens to reflect upon the psychological dynamics and mechanisms of leadership and 
collective deliberation in their poleis. So we must start by explaining the salient features of 
the poleis in general and the democratic polis of Athens in particular. 
 
1. Decision-Making in the Greek polis 
Scholars estimate that around 1000 different Greek poleis were in existence at any one time 
in the classical period. 600 of these were located across mainland Greece, the Aegean 
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islands and Aegean coast of Asia Minor and a further 400 around the rest of the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea. During this period, the vast majority of poleis operated 
self-governing ‘citizen-centred’ constitutional regimes, as opposed to monarchies or 
tyrannies.  
Some of these self-governing citizen-states were ‘democracies’ in the ancient Greek sense: 
they gave the power (kratos) of final decision in all or most areas of policy-making and 
legislation to their demos.2 The demos was the city’s ‘mass’ of adult male citizens - its 
children, women, free non-citizens and slaves did not get to vote or hold office. A key feature 
of Greek democracies in this period was their incremental extension of full political and 
juridical decision-making powers to all economic classes of their male citizenry and the use 
of monetary payment to incentivize wide participation. Two of these democracies, Athens 
and fifth-century Syracuse, were among four unusually large and successful ‘super-poleis’ 
which controlled surrounding territory of more than 2000 km2. The more numerous 
‘oligarchic’ poleis such as Sparta (also a ‘super-polis’), Corinth and Thebes (in the fifth 
century) came to be so-called because only the wealthiest ‘few’ (oligoi) citizens had 
sovereign decision-making power. Such states would thus distinguish between different 
grades of male citizen by virtue of their property holdings.  
It is important to realize that the majority of city-states (about 80%) were very small with 
territories ranging from 9 km2 to 200 km2. The estimated population (including slaves, 
women, children and free non-citizens) of these small states ranged from 500-25,000. This 
meant that most poleis had hundreds of citizens rather than thousands. Even the super-
poleis were not large in comparison with most modern nation states, with territories ranging 
between 2000 and 12000 km2 and populations of between 75,000 and 250,000. Classical 
democratic Athens’ adult citizen male population will have fluctuated but estimates range 
between 20,000 and 40,000. 
The fact that Greek poleis were small-scale in this way meant that it was both feasible and 
efficacious for these states to devote a good deal of time and organizational effort to face-to-
face counsel and debate among their citizens. Regardless of whether they were 
democracies, oligarchies, tyrannies or monarchies, most poleis had a citizen council (boule) 
and/or a senate of ‘elders’ (gerousia), and a much larger citizen-assembly (ecclesia), courts 
of law (dikasteria) and a number of ‘magistrates’ (archons) who were elected or appointed by 
lot. So, it was the manner in which power was divided between these different deliberative 
institutions and offices, and the restricted access to some of them, which distinguished each 
type of regime.  
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Athens had the most radical and participatory form of citizen-centred democracy. For 
example: it had a sovereign assembly which met as much as forty times per year in 
Aristotle’s day and this required a quorum of 6000 citizens to deliberate and decide on 
certain issues; it made extensive use of annual sortition (lots), as opposed to elections or 
property qualifications, as a means of filling its many important administrative positions and 
its 500-strong executive boule; some of its lawcourts used randomly selected citizen juries 
numbering hundreds. These institutional arrangements embodied the ideal that all the free 
male citizens of Attica would enhance the quality of the city’s decisions by virtue of their 
shared deliberations and the aggregation and alignment of citizens’ relevant knowledge and 
expertise. It has been persuasively argued by Josh Ober that this deliberative-epistemic 
ideal was largely realized in practice and, despite the major setback of losing the 
Peloponnesian War, it made classical Athens the most successful and prosperous of the 
classical poleis (Ober 2008). But even in oligarchic poleis such as Sparta or Corinth, the 
citizen assembly was convened from time to time and thereby ‘served to provide some 
degree of participation for ordinary citizens, as well as a means by which information could 
be conveyed and decisions ratified’ (Brock and Hodkinson, 2000, p.10). And because poleis 
were so small, their oligarchic councils could hardly have avoided interaction with the rest of 
the citizen community or the mobilization of mass opinion in support of whatever the ruling 
minority had decided.   
So, there was a strong consensual and deliberative aspect to all self-governing classical 
Greek poleis and we know that even when city-states were subject to a tyrant or monarch 
they sometimes held assemblies. This means that the representation of political decision-
making in a Euripidean tragedy and Thucydides’ account of Pericles’ interactions with the 
Athenian democratic assembly which I discuss below would have been of interest to citizens 
of all Greek states and not just the Athenians who were unquestionably the primary 
audience. In the case of Thucydides, it seems likely that we are dealing mainly with a literate 
audience of wealthy elite citizens. 
What I hope to show is that these two texts prompted citizen-audiences to reflect very deeply 
on the processes by which they come to make political or legislative decisions in a council or 
assembly. They also stimulate reflection among elite leaders on their own involvement in 
such processes. I will also argue that both texts achieve these forms of reflection by 
anticipating two partially-overlapping areas of recent empirical research into possible errors 
in, or distortions of human deliberation and decision-making.3 Let me briefly outline those 
areas and their salient findings. 
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2. A Catalogue of Errors 
Empirical work in sociology, political science and political psychology has identified a 
number of ‘pathologies’, ‘effects’ or ‘biases’ which can lead workplace committees, juries and 
democratic-deliberative bodies, whether small or large, to make poor or ‘inauthentic’ 
decisions. An ‘inauthentic’ decision would be one which would not be made if the decision-
takers had been given much fuller access to relevant information and arguments (Luskin et 
al. 2016). Let me briefly outline the ‘pathologies’, ‘effects’ and ‘biases’ of group decision-
making which are salient to my argument.  
i) The ‘common knowledge effect’. This is where a group can end up making a poor or 
‘inauthentic’ decision because it focuses debate around information which the majority of the 
group shares rather than vital but unshared information (Gigone and Hastie 1993). 
ii) ‘Groupthink’ and ‘homogenization’. A group may make poor or inauthentic decisions 
because it has become too inward-looking and self-reinforcing in its outlook (Janis 1982; 
Fuller and Aldag 1998). Some participants, aiming to gain approval or avoid conflict, may 
self-censor or simply adopt the deliberative group’s prevailing views: this can prevent 
attitudes, information and arguments being aired and thereby risks an inauthentic or poor 
decision (Sunstein and Hastie 2015). Of course, homogenization might be glossed positively 
if it describes an outcome of consensus following a healthy, well-informed exchange of 
diverse views and arguments which reflect the participation and expertise of the whole 
deliberating body (Luskin et al. 2016, p. 4). But one key symptom of unhelpful ‘groupthink’ is 
that that the group entertains illusions of invulnerability which in turn create excessive 
optimism and encourage unwarranted risk-taking (Janis 1982). This is further exacerbated 
when the group does not see a need to consult independent, external expertise to fill its 
gaps in knowledge or understanding. 
iii) ’Polarization’. There are different types of ‘polarization’. One type is where new 
information, debate and deliberation can actually exacerbate or entrench disagreement in a 
group around two opposed positions on an issue or push opinions to even greater extremes 
(e.g. Lord et al. 1979). Of course, this need not be seen as problematic at all if the 
mechanism by which the polarized body reaches a decision – for example, majority voting – 
results in the best policy. But in circumstances where the achievement of consensus is 
required or where the polarization seems to be either a cause or symptom of ill-informed 
debate or an unwillingness to listen to disconfirming evidence from the other side, it can be 
deemed to be negative and ‘pathological’. Another type of ‘polarization’ is where group 
members may hear more arguments on the side of the issue toward which the group initially 
leans, thus tending to make the group’s mean attitude more extreme (Sunstein 2002, 2009). 
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iv)  ‘Domination’. In the modern literature, this usually describes the ways in which ‘it may not 
be possible to insulate deliberation from the everyday effects of social inequalities’ (Luskin et 
al. 2016, p. 4). For example, the less well-off or well-educated might not be able to express 
themselves forcefully enough in the face of more well-resourced and trained-up opponents 
and/or they may be listened to less seriously. Thus the mean attitude of the group might 
move towards that of its most socially advantaged members. Another example: in a context 
where forms of ‘gender bias’ against women are consciously or unconsciously in operation, 
the views of the women in the group may be disregarded or marginalized. Another form of 
‘domination’ is when a group’s preferences and decisions are unduly influenced by a well-
resourced and highly strategic ‘special interest’ faction within itself (Stokes 1998). 
v) Rhetoric, Falsehoods and Deception. It should be obvious that exposure to intentional or 
unintentional falsehoods about relevant information could easily lead a group to make poor 
and ‘inauthentic’ decisions. ‘Rhetoric’ is more ambiguous. Some normative theorists of 
deliberative democracy argue that emotive and powerful forms of political persuasion are too 
manipulative and coercive to count as positive forms of argumentation and evidence-sharing 
within a group. This is especially associated with the Habermasian tradition of grounding 
deliberative democracy in ‘communicative rationality’ – where the goal of discussion is 
reciprocal understanding between individuals rather than success in achieving predefined 
individual goals (Habermas 1996). But other normative theorists of democracy embrace 
rhetoric as an inevitable component of deliberative communication and provide empirical 
evidence that it can often be a benign tool for shifting opinions, for representing and 
explaining excluded and marginalized sub-groups and views, and for enhancing empathy 
and understanding between segments of a divided community (Dryzek 2002, pp. 51-55). 
A second area of salience to me is the empirical work in cognitive science, psychology and 
‘behavioural economics’ which has revealed that an individual’s calculations, judgements 
and decisions are arrived at via two different ‘systems’ in the brain: there is a ‘fast’, 
automatic ‘system 1’ of thinking which forms judgements and executes decisions before we 
are even aware of doing so, and then there is the slow, effortful ‘system 2’ where we 
consciously and very deliberately weigh up options, calculate sums and probabilities, 
imagine the steps of a plan, and so on (Kahneman 2011). It should be stressed that the 
identification of two systems is itself an explanatory device rather than an accurate mapping 
of physical-material processes or discrete areas in the brain.  
The two systems interact so that errors made by our ‘fast’ system can be noticed and 
corrected by our ‘slow system’, or so that we use the right system for the right job. However, 
our ‘system 2’ can be very ‘lazy’ and ineffective and there is much debate about how we 
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should characterize the overall performance of our ‘two system’ brains. Some argue that we 
are very prone to mistakes due to hard-wired cognitive ‘biases’, emotions, snap judgements 
and ‘heuristics’ (short-cuts, so-called ’gut feelings’ or rules of thumb). Others argue that 
‘heuristics’, experience-led intuitions and snap judgements serve us very well indeed and in 
certain circumstances may actually outperform more prolonged and effortful processes of 
calculation and deliberation or over-reliance on algorithms (e.g. Klein 1998; Gigerenzer 
2014).  
Much of this research shows that the kind of thinking that works best will vary depending on 
the task at hand and that individuals’ susceptibility to biases is highly variable. Some people 
are better than others at using their ‘system 2’ effectively. And while certain forms of training 
can reduce our susceptibility to ‘effects’ and ‘biases’ and can boost the effectiveness of our 
‘system 2’ considerably, our fast and frugal ‘system 1’ can never be switched off and no 
matter how intelligent or ‘rational’ we think we are, all of us will make many decisions in our 
lives which are essentially based on a mistaken perception or flawed calculation of risks. 
These observations have led to the development of ‘prospect theory’ as a more realistic 
model for predicting the economic behaviour of real humans than the ‘rational choice theory’ 
used in traditional economic modelling (Kahneman 2011, pp. 279-87) 
Under the auspices of this second strand of research, there are three clusters of cognitive 
‘bias’, ‘heuristic’ or ‘effect’ which are especially relevant to my ancient examples: 
vi) ‘What You See Is All There Is’. In order to think fast and make sense of partial information 
in a complex world, our two-system brains like to achieve coherence.  But in order to achieve 
the coherence and cognitive ease which such fast thinking requires, we tend to operate a 
number of biases which Kahneman places under the umbrella term ‘What You See Is All 
There Is’ (hereafter WYSIATI for short). Put briefly, WYSIATI biases mean this: 
‘The confidence that individuals have in their beliefs depends mostly on the quality of 
the story they can tell about what they see, even if they see little. We often fail to 
allow for the possibility that evidence that should be critical to our judgement is 
missing – what we see is all there is. Furthermore, our associative system tends to 
settle on a coherent pattern of activation and suppresses doubt and ambiguity’ 
(Kahneman, 2011 pp. 87-8).  
vii) ‘Availability bias’, ‘affect heuristic’ and associated cascades. These are particular 
examples of WYSIATI. Traumatic and unpredicted events such as mass-casualty terrorist 
attacks or tornado strikes become highly ‘available’ through publicity and can lead people to 
greatly overestimate the statistical risks of air travel or living in ‘Tornado Alley’ (Kahneman 
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2011, pp.137-145) . The more novel, poignant and vivid the thoughts and images associated 
with a particular risk are for the mind, the more that risk will be overestimated in relation to 
others and the more it will produce and exacerbate fear. Because we use our emotions as 
‘heuristics’, these fears in turn materially affect our judgements about relative risks and guide 
our decisions (Slovic et al. 2002). For example, in the 12 months after 9/11, so many 
Americans chose to drive rather than fly to their destinations, that an estimated 1600 extra 
road deaths occurred. The very low probability of actually being caught up in a terrorist 
attack as opposed to the much higher risk of driving more than 12 miles at a time was 
masked by the prominence of 9/11 and subsequent security scares in the media and the fear 
that they introduced (Gigerenzer 2014, pp. 8-14). Sometimes ‘availability cascades’ occur: 
for example a minor, localized public health problem, can create mass panic through 
exaggerated and blanket coverage by the media. This self-sustaining ‘snowballing’ of fear 
then sidelines any expertise and evidence which suggest that the associated health risks are 
minimal or spurious. Such cascades may even lead to unwarranted changes in public policy 
(Kuran and Sunstein 1999). 
viii) ‘Overconfidence’ or ‘optimism bias’. This is a specific example of WYSIATI and it is 
especially critical for decision-making and planning by organizations, leaders and 
entrepreneurs. It describes a documented tendency to underestimate the costs and 
durations of projects, to ‘focus to the causal role of skill and neglect the role of luck’ and to 
‘focus on what we know and neglect what we do not know’ (Kahneman 2011, p. 259). 
Optimism bias often leads to the underestimation of risks when decision-taking. In some 
cases, such errors of calculation can nevertheless result in beneficial innovations and 
successes.  But they can also cause projects and policies to fail disastrously, take too long 
or cost too much. 
 
3. Deliberative errors in Euripides’ Suppliant Women 
Athenian tragedies were performed at many different Dionysian festivals throughout Attica in 
the fifth century BCE. But the largest and most prestigious dramatic festival was the annual 
City Dionysia which took place at the Theatre of Dionysus on the south slope of the 
Acropolis in the heart of the city of Athens itself. The tragedies performed at this festival 
were watched by at least 5000 Athenian citizens and visitors from other Greek states. Some 
scholars put the audience figure as high as 15000. Euripides’ tragedy The Suppliant Women 
was performed at this festival sometime in the 420s BCE when Athens was at war with 
Sparta.  
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This play stages a story from the mythic-historical age of heroes which was often cited by 
the democracy’s orators as an example of one of Athens’ most glorious and altruistic military 
exploits. In the tragedy’s opening scene, we learn that a group of mothers from the city of 
Argos and their king, Adrastus, have come as ritual suppliants to the altar of a temple in the 
Attic town of Eleusis. They petition king Theseus and the city of Athens to bring about the 
burial of their sons who have died in an attack on the city of Thebes in support of Polyneices’ 
attempt to claim back the throne from his brother. Theseus cross-examines Adrastus about 
the whys and wherefores of the decision to support Polyneices (Euripides: Suppliant Women 
155-61, trans. Morwood 2007):  
THESEUS: Did you consult prophets and study the flames of burnt offerings? 
ADRASTUS: Alas, what you charge against me was my greatest blunder. 
TH: It appears you did not go with divine approval. 
AD: And what is more, I went in spite of what Amphiaraus said. 
TH: Did you so lightly disregard the gods’ will? 
AD: Yes, for the clamour (thorubos) of young men shattered my judgement. 
TH: You followed strength of spirit (eupsuchia) rather than strength of counsel 
(euboulia). 
 
The king of Argos admits that he did not consult prophets or look for divine signs. He even 
ignored the warnings of his city’s trusted seer Amphiaraus. Instead, he says, he was swayed 
by the shouts of the young men of Argos who were in favour of making war on Thebes. The 
seeking of religious prophecies as sources of advice might seem deeply ‘irrational’ to 
modern readers, but there is plenty of historical and comparative anthropological evidence to 
suggest that the precise manner and uses of such consultations by leaders or deliberative 
bodies in Greek poleis were often a means of managing risks, of clarifying options or of 
lending authority to difficult decisions that had already been made.4 For many in the fifth-
century Greek audience, Adrastus’ failure to consult the evidence supplied by divination and 
the advice of a trusted prophet would seem deeply foolish, just as it does to Theseus.  
This exchange anticipates a number of decision-making ‘errors’ and ‘effects’ which I detailed 
in the previous section. The Greek word which Adrastus uses to describe the young men’s 
‘clamour’ to which he succumbed is ‘thorubos’. This is usually used to describe the noise 
made by a large crowd within a political assembly, mass jury or theatrical audience. Thus we 
have a reference to the way in which a sub-group within the city has created an effect of 
domination. And if the ‘clamour’ of the young men is taken to include their speeches in the 
assembly, the exchange may also be an interesting dissection of the way in which rhetoric 
can manipulate its target and thereby drown out the countering advice and evidence of an 
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expert (in this case, Amphiaraus). Finally, Theseus’ pithy diagnosis that the ‘clamour’ caused 
Adrastus to substitute eupsuchia (courage, spiritedness) in place of good counsel (euboulia) 
hints that the Argive king substituted an appropriate awareness of the possible risks of a 
campaign against Thebes with an emotionally-compromised judgement brought about by the 
young men’s fervour. He succumbed to the affect heuristic and/or overconfidence. 
Theseus soon returns to these dynamics and reflects on them in a way which brings out the 
workings of deception and rhetoric that can occur in deliberative bodies. He also returns to 
the domination of a faction (ambitious young men), and argues that the very rich and the 
very poor can create polarization if left to their own devices (231-49): 
you used force and went against the gods and destroyed your city, led astray by 
young men who delight in winning honour and intensify wars with no regard for 
justice, destroying their citizens, one so that he can be a general, another so that he 
can grasp power and behave high-handedly, another to make money, not 
considering if the ordinary people are harmed at all by such treatment. For there are 
three classes of citizen. The rich (are) harmful and always covet more, while the 
have-nots who lack the resources for living are dangerous, giving way to envy, and 
stick nasty torments into the haves, deceived by the rhetoric (literally ‘tongues’, 
glossai) of worthless leaders. Of these three classes, it is the middle one that keeps 
cities safe, guarding whatever constitution the city sets up. And in view of that am I 
to become your ally? What good grounds for that could I give my fellow citizens? 
This analysis may well have struck a chord with the audience’s real experience of 
assemblies and councils in their poleis. But it also seems cold and more than a little 
pompous. Furthermore, Theseus is wrong to initially reject the appeal of Adrastus and the 
Argive women when they are suppliants. He has both a religious duty and a patriotic, civic 
obligation to put his city and its military might at their service (Burian 1985). He changes his 
mind when he listens to the advice of his mother, Aithra, which goes along these lines (286-
364). But in changing his mind, Theseus makes a point of maintaining that his analysis of 
where Adrastus was ‘tripped up’ in his deliberations is correct (334-6). It is striking that this 
analysis and the predicament of the chastened Adrastus focus the citizen audience’s 
attention on how mistakes and miscalculations can come about at the level of polis-wide 
deliberations and decision-making.  
This focus returns for a third time in a famous debate between Theseus and the Theban 
Herald who has come to tell Theseus that the tyrant Creon will not give back the bodies of 
the Argive dead as requested. It is notable that the Herald’s criticism of democracy matches 
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up with some of the biases and effects which I have listed in section 2. For example, he 
warns Theseus against proposing war against Thebes to the people of Athens (476-491): 
Take thought, and do not, in your rage at my words on the grounds that you have a 
free city, make a puffed-up answer, when you have less to be confident about. For 
we should not trust in the hope which has engaged many cities (in conflict), urging 
their passions (thumos) to excess. For whenever war comes to be voted on by the 
people, no-one any longer reckons on his own death but assumes that this disaster 
will come to someone else. If death were before the eyes when the vote is cast, 
Greece would never be suffering destruction in its madness for war.  
The Herald’s vivid point is that citizens of Greek cities would not so readily vote for a war if 
they had death before their eyes and did not entertain the expectation that someone else, 
and not they themselves, would die in that war. This very closely matches some of the 
alleged symptoms of groupthink: for example, its tendency to create illusions of 
invulnerability which in turn encourage excessive risk-taking. It also brings out that aspect of 
optimism bias wherein deliberators neglect the operations of chance and ‘unknowns’ in their 
calculations of risk. There is also some suggestion of the common knowledge effect and 
affect heuristic. 
Despite these cautionary notes, the Athenians’ decision to support Theseus’ call for 
intervention and, when it comes to it, to go to war with Thebes can be regarded as a wise 
one by a number of measures. There is a strong sense that the Athenian blood spilt in the 
ensuing battle is justified, not just because it achieves the return of the seven corpses in 
accordance with religious obligations, but because it establishes the greatness of Athens, its 
people and Theseus himself. However, the play’s emphasis on the circumstances and 
terrible consequences of Adrastus’ disastrous decision-making and the Herald’s all-too-
plausible analysis of the working of ‘untrustworthy hope’ in a democratic body remind the 
audience that decision-making about war, with its extremely high stakes, requires care and 
vigilance in relation to headstrong interest groups and over-optimism.  
My argument that this Euripidean tragedy highlights and explores various possible 
‘pathologies’, ‘biases’ and ‘effects’ in a Greek city’s political decision-making processes is 
not generalizable to all extant Greek tragedies. But many other tragedies do represent and 
discuss juridical or political decision-making in heroic-era Athens, Thebes or Argos in a 
similar fashion. And even those tragic dramas which focus on more domestic or dynastic 
dilemmas, deliberations and decisions can be said to foreground the complexities of 
decision-making in ways which were salient and enriching for their audiences’ status as 
citizen-deliberators (Hall 2009; Hall 2012). This thematic focus on the whys and wherefores 
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of decision-making errors might help to explain Athens’ considerable investment in this mass 
art form and its flourishing under the democracy.5 As we saw in my first section, Josh Ober 
has characterized Athens as a successful state by virtue of the fact that it was a specific type 
of participatory democracy which fostered innovation, expertise, learning and the ‘alignment’ 
of its citizens’ use of these towards collective goals (Ober 2008). If this is right, then Greek 
drama may have contributed to this success by highlighting typical ‘epistemic’ and 
‘deliberative’ errors which the citizenry must guard against. Greek tragedy focuses on the 
terrible consequences of mortal overconfidence, disastrous choices, the dangers of ignoring 
or misinterpreting prophets and oracles and the chasm between human uncertainty and a 
future which is divinely ordained. But this is not simply a lesson in fatalism, or the importance 
of mortal piety in the face of chance events and divine caprice. Greek tragedy is also 
interested in examining the points where characters might have decided differently and the 
influences on their cognition which prevented them from doing so.  
4. Thucydides and Pericles as Political Psychologists 
My second case study focuses on Pericles’ responses to Athenian doubts and fears and the 
way in which they are represented in Book 2 of Thucydides’ Histories. We will start with his 
final speech to the Athenian assembly in that book (2.60-64). Sometimes in the Greek 
historians, wise and powerful oratory has its effects negated by certain historical 
contingencies or a particular faction’s manipulation of the perceptions of Athens’ 
enfranchised citizen population (the demos). But in this speech, Pericles is represented as 
successfully overcoming these obstacles through speech and strategy. Not only that, but his 
oration partially achieves its aims by offering a commentary on the very theme of the 
malleability of ‘demotic’ cognition itself.   
The situation in which the elected Athenian general and statesman Pericles finds himself 
prior to this speech is as follows. It is the summer of 430 BCE, the second year of the 
Peloponnesian war between Athens and its allied states on the one side, and Sparta and its 
Peloponnesian allies on the other. A great plague has ravaged the city and Thucydides 
famously offers a vivid autopsy of that disease’s ravages and its terrible effects both on the 
Athenian populace and their normal ways of life. These effects were made worse by over-
crowding within the city of Athens. The over-crowding was a direct result of Pericles’ 
defensive policy of evacuating the countryside and not engaging the invading Peloponnesian 
land forces in pitched battle. Then the Peloponnesians mount their second invasion of Attica. 
Thucydides tells us that this invasion, combined with the terrible experience of the plague, 
prompted the Athenians to undergo a change of view. The Athenians ‘blamed Pericles for 
having persuaded them to go to war and held him responsible for the misfortunes which had 
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befallen them’ (2.59.2). They were eager to come to an agreement with the Spartans and 
had even sent envoys. With no agreement yet achieved, the Athenians were at a loss for 
ideas and they ‘turned against’ Pericles. Thucydides says that Pericles expected the people 
to act like this and called an assembly ‘with the double object of restoring confidence and of 
leading them from these angry feelings to a calmer and more hopeful state of mind’ (59.3). 
The speech which Pericles then delivers is successful in stopping the Athenians from 
seeking terms with the Spartans and in making them more enthusiastic for the war.  It is 
long, complex and wide-ranging in its connections with the wider narrative of the History in 
general and it is pivotal to the Thucydidean heroization of Pericles in particular. But 
commentators have not made the points I am about to make.6 I want to consider a key 
passage from the speech and I have put the most relevant sentences in bold (2.61.2-4):7 
For my part, I stand where I stood before, and do not alter my position. But it is you 
who have changed. For it has happened, now that you are suffering, that you regret 
the consent you gave me when you were still unharmed, and in your weakness of 
judgement (asthenei tes gnomes) my advice now appears to you wrong. The 
reason is that each one of you is already aware [lit. ‘has perception 
(aisthesis)’] of his hardships, whereas the proof [lit. ‘demonstration’/ 
‘manifestation’: delosis] of the advantages is still lacking to all, and now that 
a major reversal of fortune has come upon you without any warning, you are 
now too dejected in mind to persevere in your former resolutions. For the 
mind is enslaved by that which is unforeseen and unexpected and happens 
contrary to all calculation; and this is exactly the experience you have had, 
not only in other matters, but especially as regards the plague. Nevertheless, 
seeing that you are inhabitants of a great city and have been brought up in a way of 
life which corresponds to her greatness, you should willingly endure even the worst 
of misfortunes and not let your good repute be obliterated. For just as all men claim 
the right to despise him who through presumption tries to grasp a reputation which 
he does not deserve, so they equally claim a right to resent him who through 
feebleness fails to live up to the reputation he already enjoys. You should, rather, 
put away your private grief and devote yourselves to our communal security. 
Pericles diagnoses the people’s change of heart as caused by a combination of suffering 
and limited perception. The terrible suffering caused by the war, Pericles’ defensive strategy 
and the plague are all clear and present to their perception – the aisthesis of each and every 
one of them. By contrast, the advantages which the people will accrue from following 
Pericles’ advice is not yet in evidence. These must be the gains which he outlined in his first 
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speech at the end of book 1 of the History. In that speech, Pericles successfully persuaded 
the Athenians that freedom from Peloponnesian diktat and the wealth and power which 
Athens derives from its empire would most likely only be preserved, and eventually 
enhanced, if the Athenians went to war with the Spartans immediately and followed his ‘city 
and ships’ strategy regardless of any reversals and concomitant doubts (1.140-144). The 
proximate, vivid evidence of the invasions of Attica and the plague is dominating the 
Athenians’ perception, says Pericles, and it is hard for them to see any balancing proof that 
Pericles’ recommended strategy will ultimately confer greater benefits than any that could be 
derived from an immediate truce and negotiation. This why they are regretting their initial 
decision. 
Now, of course, this can be read as special pleading and rhetoric on Pericles’ part. But his 
strategy here is to tell the Athenians that they are succumbing to ‘What You See Is All There 
Is’. To bring this out, it is worth re-stating Kahneman’s summary of this particular cluster of 
biases and heuristics: 
The confidence that individuals have in their beliefs depends mostly on the quality 
of the story they can tell about what they see, even if they see little. We often fail to 
allow for the possibility that evidence that should be critical to our judgement is 
missing – what we see is all there is. Furthermore, our associative system tends to 
settle on a coherent pattern of activation and suppresses doubt and ambiguity 
(Kahneman, 2011 pp. 87-8).  
Pericles also says that the Athenian demos are having their judgement skewed and 
degraded by sudden and unexpected reversals in their fortunes, in particular the plague. 
Such unpredictable events enslave the mind, he says. This observation seems to anticipate 
some key findings of the way in which availability bias and the affect heuristic can influence 
judgements and decisions: unforeseen and highly traumatic events are especially likely to 
trigger miscalculations of relative risk and alter our attitudes and behaviour as a result of 
heightened fears. 
A key element of Pericles’ psychological analysis here is the role of perception and its effect 
on the citizens’ imaginations and emotions. This is a constant theme in Thucydides. The 
Spartan king Archidamus explicitly relies on the notion that people in general, and the 
Athenians in particular, will find it impossible to resist an angry impulse to rush into a full 
land-based engagement with his Peloponnesian forces when an unusual calamity bursts into 
their field of vision (2.11.7-8 ): 
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we have therefore every reason to expect them to risk a battle, if they have not 
already set out before we are yet there, at any rate when they see us in their 
territory laying it waste and destroying their property. For with all men, when they 
suffer an unfamiliar calamity, it is the sight set then and there before their eyes 
which makes them angry, and when they are angry they rush into action 
making least use of rational calculation (logismoi) and most use of their 
passion (thumos). 
Once the Spartans get to Acharnae, a region of Attica which was visible from the walls of 
Athens itself, it is indeed the sight of them ravaging the land which makes the Athenians 
want to abandon Pericles’ policy of non-engagement and mount a full scale land attack. 
Notice how Thucydides lingers on the causal relationship between this shocking, and for 
many, unprecedented visual spectacle and its effects on the emotions and behaviour of the 
citizenry (2.21.2):  
But when they saw (eidon) the army in the neighbourhood of Acharnae, only sixty 
stadia from the city, they thought the situation no longer tolerable; on the contrary, it 
naturally appeared to them a terrible thing when their land was being ravaged in 
open view (emphanei), a sight which the younger men had never seen, or even 
the older men except in the Persian war; and the general opinion, especially on the 
part of the younger men, was that they ought to go forth and put a stop to it. They 
gathered in knots and engaged in hot disputes, some urging that they should go 
out, others opposing this course of action.  
This account may well be influenced by one of Thucydides’ contemporaries, the rhetorician 
and sophist Gorgias. Gorgias’ mock speech in defence of Helen puts emphasis upon the 
power of sight and spectacle (opsis) to leave its mark upon, and disturb the soul to such an 
extent that it stirs emotions and thereby alters behaviour (Helen 15-19). It is perhaps 
significant that Gorgias judges opsis to be as powerful as words in this regard (18). But the 
above passage also underlines the shrewdness of Archidamus’ prediction of how the 
Athenians will react. 
Thucydides goes on to narrate that the Athenian people now started to turn their anger on 
Pericles and ‘forgetting his previous advice, they accused him of cowardice in not doing what 
a general should and leading them out to battle’ (21.2). Seeing that the people’s ‘intentions 
were not for the best’ (ou ta arista phronountas) and convinced that his policy of non-
engagement was still sound, Pericles decides not to allow a people’s assembly: ‘if they got 
together there would be an outbreak of anger (orge) lacking in judgement (gnome) that 
would result in them making a serious mistake’ (22.1). Archidamus’ provocation is thwarted 
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because Pericles is able to prevent the predicted descent into passion (thumos) and anger 
(orge) from changing policy and (it is implied) he himself does not abandon his rational 
calculation (logismos) or good judgement (gnome). Thucydides tells us that Pericles then 
took steps to maintain calm in the city, sent out cavalry raids to prevent the Peloponnesians 
getting too close to the city walls and launched a naval expedition against the Peloponnese 
itself. 
According to Thucydides, then, Pericles manages the Athenians’ anger in two different ways 
depending on the specificities of context. After the first invasion, he contains the Athenians’ 
angry urge to abandon the policy of non-engagement by temporarily blocking access to their 
own democratic-deliberative body. This is fascinating, because it seems to tell the reader of 
Thucydides that there are certain situations where the mood of an audience could be beyond 
the reach of persuasive arguments. If Pericles is taken to be a model leader – and this does 
seem to be Thucydides’ assessment of him (2.65)8 - it turns out to be just as important for 
that leader to know when to prevent a debate on policy among the citizenry, as it is to know 
when to call an assembly with the aim of persuading it.  In the language of my second 
section, Thucydides implies that Pericles was aware of the danger that a cascade of 
availability bias and affect heuristic brought on by the high visibility and proximity of the 
effects the Peloponnesian invasion on the countryside might well lead the Athenians to enact 
a catastrophic and unwarranted change of policy. In this instance, the implication is that 
Pericles correctly identified the high risk of such a change occurring if he allowed an 
assembly and so he opted for the lower risks associated with avoiding a debate, and with 
initiating the cavalry raids and sending out some ships.  
After the second invasion and the plague, Pericles judges that he must call an assembly and 
make a big speech in order to bring the Athenians back into line. After all, he had predicted 
and expected that they would falter in this way (1.140.1, 2.59.3-4, 60.1). Although the 
Athenians’ attempts to make peace with the Spartans are not working, there is an implication 
that Pericles sees that the situation here is very different to that which held after the first 
invasion: this time, there is nothing to lose in trying to persuade the Athenians to stick to their 
guns. He loses out personally for a brief period: the Athenians accepted his arguments but 
fined him and seem to have briefly rejected his leadership (2.65.3-4). But they soon re-
elected him as general and once more ‘entrusted their affairs to his management’ (2.65.4). 
Commentators are right to stress that Pericles’ speech brings his audience around via a 
number of strategies: he reminds them of ‘the individual’s duty to the state (60.2-4), his own 
unique qualities of leadership (60.5-61) and the glories of the Athenian empire (62-64.5)’ 
(Rusten 1989, p. 197). But they have missed the importance of Pericles’ political-
psychological analysis of why the Athenians have turned on him in this oration. Whether 
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Pericles really accused the citizenry of ‘WYSIATI thinking’ is impossible to know: the 
question of how accurate and verbatim are Thucydidean speeches is vexed. 9  It seems 
possible that Thucydides is importing his own analysis here. Either way, Thucydides shows 
his readers how effective it can be in rhetorical terms to make one’s listeners reflect on (what 
we would now call) their own cognitive biases. 
5.  Conclusion 
Thucydides clearly had a good awareness, through observation, anecdotal evidence and 
hearsay, of the sorts of biases, effects, heuristics and cascades which I outlined in section 2 
and which modern social science and cognitive science have now identified and labelled 
through experimental work and data collection. He uses Pericles’ career and speeches to 
show how an awareness of them can be a powerful tool of leadership as well as a 
persuasive strategy of deliberative oratory in its own right. It may even be that orators like 
Pericles themselves helped citizens to monitor their own susceptibility to these potentially 
‘pathological’ features of participatory democratic decision-making.  
When we take these Thucydidean passages together with my section on Suppliant Women, 
we can also see how popular drama and more elite intellectual writing in Athens are 
concerned to explore the epistemic and cognitive vulnerabilities which can lead collectives 
and their leaders to make poor decisions. The examples I have selected today err on the 
side of a very paternalistic attitude wherein mass decision-making is seen to require the 
corrective manipulation of an enlightened leader. And of course, some of the modern policy 
applications of the research outlined in my second section are avowedly paternalistic too (e. 
g. Thaler and Sunstein 2008). But in the case of the tragic material, a non-elite citizen 
audience were at least afforded the opportunity to reflect on certain biases, heuristics and 
pathologies which they and their leaders might exhibit. And they were perhaps prompted into 
greater awareness and monitoring of such tendenccies during their future deliberations as a 
result. 
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1 The initial research conducted for this paper was done while I was an ‘evidence theme’ 
Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Study at the University of Durham. I am very grateful to 
the IAS directors and the other ‘evidence theme’ Fellows of January-March 2016 for 
providing stimulating discussion and feedback on this material. Thanks too to Dr Rosie 
Wyles for comments on an earlier draft.  I also gratefully acknowledge the support of the 
Leverhulme Trust for awarding me a Research Fellowship which has enabled me to 
complete work on this paper.  
 
2 Lack of surviving evidence and difficulties of definition make it hard to be precise about 
how many democratic classical poleis there were, at one time or another in this period.  
Robinson 2011 argues for 55 while Hansen & Nielsen 2004 and Hansen 2013 go for nearly 
double that figure.  
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3 The application of recent insights from cognitive science and behavioural economics on 
decision-making to classical texts and ancient history is rare but not without precedent. For 
example, Ober and Perry 2014 use Thucydides’ ‘Melian dialogue’ to show that the Greek 
historian grasped the principles underlying contemporary ‘prospect theory’ (as summarized 
and refined in Kahneman 2011).  I hope that my own work here and forthcoming will build on 
that of Ober and Perry by examining different biases, effects and heuristics in different parts 
of Thucydides and by also considering other genres such as tragedy. 
 
4 Greek states only occasionally posed questions of oracles as a means of checking or 
informing their political decision-making but it seems to have been routine for generals on 
military campaign to have taken a mantis (seer) with them and to have regularly made 
divinatory sacrifices when making important decisions (e.g. Xenophon Anabasis 5.6.29, 
6.1.22-4, 6.4.14).  At the same time (and as is typical of societies which rely heavily on 
divination) seers, omens and oracles were not always seen as reliable.  After the disastrous 
failure of the Athenian campaign in Sicily in 415, Thucydides tells us that the Athenian 
citizenry blamed ‘the oracle-mongers, the seers and all the others whose professed 
revelations of divine will had at that time encouraged their hope of conquering Sicily’ (8.1.1). 
Greek literature abounds with examples where consultants fail to correctly interpret the 
prophecy given to them: for example, when Croesus invaded Persia on the oracle’s advice 
that if he did so he would ‘destroy a great empire’, he failed to see that the oracle was 
referring to his own empire (Herodotus 1.53).  On all of this and more see Parker 1985, 
Harrison 2000, Bowden 2005 and Eidinow 2007. 
 
5 For a different but compatible account of the way in which Greek tragedy and comedy 
reflect and reinforce Athens’ specifically democratic ideology and culture, see Burian 2011. 
 
6 See, however, the analyses of Halliwell 2002, 70-2 and Greenwood 2006, pp, 69-76, which 
stress that Thucydides has Pericles use medical and other language drawn from the context 
of the plague to suggest that the Athenian demos’ political rationality and judgement have 
become ‘diseased’, while his own remain unaffected. My emphasis is totally different and yet 
entirely compatible with these points.   
 
7 My translations from Thucydides are based on Smith 1919 with occasional adaptations and 
glosses. Many of those changes draw on the following scholarly translations and 
commentaries: Rhodes 1988; Rusten 1989; Hornblower 1991; Hammond 2009. 
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8 Thucydides’ admiration for Pericles should not be conflated with an entirely straightforward 
or uncritical stance towards his decision to take Athens to war, a decision which, after his 
death, does end in disaster for the Athenians.  See Connor 1984, pp. 71-75 on the ways in 
which the text raises possible questions about the wisdom of Pericles’ strategy whilst also 
forcing the reflection that if Athens had negotiated an early peace agreement,  its empire, 
power and reputation would have been severely compromised. 
 
9 By the same token, we may also suspect the historical accuracy of Archidamus’ astute 
observations in his speech.  Thucydides’ own statement on the matter at 1.22.1 is difficult to 
interpret and leaves room for supposing that some speeches are closer to what was actually 
said than others.  The bibliography on this question is vast: for good discussion in 
connection with Pericles’ last speech and further references, see Greenwood 2006, pp. 67-
76. 
